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ABSTRACT

The problem examined concerns the extent to which the family orientation, in terms of its status characteristics and socialization patterns, has influenced the unique styles of campus-based politics that have emerged in the United States during the 1960's. The objective is accomplished through a general statement of the role of the family, accompanied by a discussion of the associations between family status and socialization, socialization and student politics, and between family status and student politics. This is followed by the presentation of the multivariate theoretical model under investigation, a description of the student sample, the theoretical model operationalized in terms of its endogenous components, the method of investigation, research findings and a discussion of results. Results indicate that of the 600 college students in the sample, representing most forms of political beliefs: (1) about 30% of the total variance in direction of student politics could be explained by the variables in the model; (2) family politics proved the strongest predictor of the direction of student politics, with offspring closely following the political views of their parents; (3) both social class and family politics directly affected student politics but had no effect on socialization; and (4) religion alone was able to explain variance in the direction of student politics directly and sequentially through family political argument. (Author/KJ)

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FAMILY STATUS, SOCIALIZATION AND STUDENT POLITICS: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS*

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THE PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES

The problem which this paper examines concerns the extent to which the family of orientation, in terms of its status characteristics and socialization patterns, has influenced the unique styles of campus-based politics that have emerged in the United States during the 1960's. Past research on family status, socialization and student political activism has operated primarily out of simple, bivariate causal models explaining the relationships between: (1) social status and family socialization; (2) family socialization and student politics; and (3) social status and student politics. The prototype theoretical explanation for these studies has been between a series of independent variables as they affect or explain variance in a series of dependent variables. However, if one examines these research designs in more detail, a multidimensional theoretical model emerges with at least three distinct causal or temporally related dimensions: (1) the independent dimension of family status anchorages; (2) the intervening dimension of family socialization; and (3) the dependent dimension of student political activism. Instead of the two-dimensional causal space which has been employed to explain the origins of student behavior in the past, a multivariate field appears better suited to test the theoretical assumptions available for verification.

The objective of this paper is accomplished through a general statement of the role of the family in contemporary American society, accompanied by a discussion of the associations between family status and socialization, socialization and student politics, and between family status and student politics. This is followed by the presentation of the multivariate theoretical model under investigation, a description of the student sample, the theoretical model operationalized in terms of its endogenous components, the method of investigation, research findings, and finally the discussion of our results.

THE FAMILY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

In spite of its changing role in American society, the family continues to be the primary source of social status and identification. However, due to the increasing heterogeneity of modern industrial society, the traditional function of the family is being eclipsed (see, for example, the discussions by Parsons and Bales, 1955; Greer, 1962; Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; and Langton, 1969). In the past, the family fulfilled both the economic and social needs of its members; today, this is no longer totally true. Family wage earners identify with professional or organizational spheres, while education is being taken over by schools, recreation by public, commercial enterprises and welfare by social and governmental institutions. Nevertheless, in spite of this segmentation and allocation of its traditional "sacred" responsibility, the family remains the most important institution inculcating and reinforcing societal values and fulfilling the physical and emotional needs of its members.

It appears *prima facie* at least, that a corollary exists between the increasing differentiation of modern American society and the fragmentation of the family on the one hand and an ever increasing affective need to identify with the family on the other. This pattern of parental identification is exacerbated during late adolescence or during college years when the identity crisis reaches its climax.[1] Confronted with highly competitive, conflicting and paradoxical societal values and lacking both the cognitive and affective gestalt to compromise or to accommodate them satisfactorily, youth have little recourse but to identify with values learned in the home in their confrontation with the adult "secular" world. While in late adolescence then, the family still fulfills the basic needs of college students. It provides the economic, ethnic, religious and political anchorages for its offspring and is the primary source of status, pride and self-esteem. As the foremost agent of identification and socialization:

> Youth in all nations anchor their documents within a basic family frame. ...to be sure, the mode of mention differ in different cultures...but the unquestioned fact remains that the family is the primary social institution in all lands, and our data clearly reflect this cultural universal.
> (Gillespie and Allport, 1955:8)

Increased urbanization and rationalization are having an effect on the structure of the American family. The traditional rural, male dominated dwelling unit, with its agricultural and/or entrepreneurial base, has been replaced by the highly independent, urban and mobile conjugal family unit, better suited for the exigencies of a modern, complex mass or national society.[2] Rapid industrialization has placed increased demands on professional and organizational expertise and entree into the national labor market is no longer contingent upon age and sex alone, but upon technical, scientific skill and professional ability. Life styles concomitantly are changing as the scales of living are increasingly being modified by expanding credit and protracting commodity markets.

The trend today in family socialization patterns is toward what Miller and Swanson (1958) call "bureaucratic-democratic" techniques of socialization replacing the more "entrepreneurial-authoritarian" techniques. Historically, this has not always been the archetypical pattern of child socialization in the United States. These authors differentiate between four main periods of child rearing practices: (1) 1700-1850, marked by declining techniques of "breaking the child's will" but increased use of corporal punishment; (2) 1860-1920, corporal punishment reaches its peak and then declines; (3) 1920-1940's, children weaned and toilet trained by formal methods under the rubric of science; and (4) the late 1940's to the present time, children given more freedom in determining their own toilet training practices, needs and desires (Miller and Swanson, 1958:Chapter 1).

Bronfenbrenner (1958) and others (Sears, Maccoby and Levin, 1957; White, 1957; Kohn and Carroll, 1960; Kohn, 1959) support this view, maintaining that since World War II, the trend has been toward permissive child rearing practices as advocated by Drs. Benjamin Spock, Arnold Gesell and the U.S. Government Printing Office Infant Care Manual, all of which were written in the 1940's. Most studies in socialization agree that youngsters today are freer to challenge the precepts of parental authority and to question the efficacy of such authority from an early age than was the case with their parents or grandparents. As a result, such children emerge into contemporary American society with relatively little experience of authority structures based solely upon impersonal law or sheer force.

FAMILY STATUS AND SOCIALIZATION

Much of the recent research on socialization suggests that parental socialization is a class-based phenomenon and that the permissive styles articulated by the modern generation are essentially middle-class values. Bronfenbrenner (1958, 1961, 1967), Kohn (1959, 1963), Kohn and Carroll

(1960), Duvall (1946) and Clausen (1968:131-181) all discovered that the dominant motif of middle-class parental values centers around the child developing his own standards of conduct, and that socially desirable behavior consists essentially of the child acting according to the dictates of his own conscience. Middle-class parents are more concerned with the motives and feelings of their children and are more attentive to internal dynamics. They want their children to be eager to learn, to confide in their parents and in effect, to "be happy." Middle-class parents rely mainly on indirect psychological techniques of discipline, that is, reasoning and appealing to feelings of guilt.

These authors concomitantly discovered that working-class parents are more likely to employ physical punishment in child rearing practices. Working-class parents frequently respond to the immediate consequences of the child's behavior and tend more often to physically punish their children for reasons of propriety; that is, children should be "neat," "clean," "respect adults," and "conform" to externally imposed standards. Above all, working-class parents do not want their children to violate proscriptions or prescriptions that tend to threaten family respectability--desiring their daughters to be "virtuous" and "act like little ladies" and their sons to be "athletic," "virile" and "masculine." Even though the working class in the United States enjoy relatively high incomes, they have not yet achieved the style of living reserved for the middle class.

> In effect, the working class has striven for, and partially achieved, an American dream distinctly different from the dream of success and achievement. In an affluent society it is possible for the worker to be the traditionalists--politically,

> economically, and most relevant here, in his values for his children to conform to external authority because the parents themselves are willing to accord respect to authority, in return for security and respectability. Their conservatism in child rearing is part of a more general conservatism and traditionalism. (Kohn, 1963:470)

From the foregoing discussion, it becomes evident that family socialization is conditioned partially at least by its location in the social class hierarchy which has direct bearing on child rearing practices, in addition to determining the style of living, educational opportunity and occupational aspiration of its offspring (Sewell and Shah, 1968:559-572). But as students of sociology have known for years, there are other equally important independent conditioning or causal factors in the socialization process that influence the political attitudes and behavior of youth. Among these additional independent, family status variables are: membership in ethnic, nationality or racial subcultural groups; identification with religious organizations; membership and participation in politics within the larger society. As Dawson and Prewitt (1969:105-126) have noted, membership in social status groupings is often established, directly or indirectly by the family. Such families are situated in various social strata, and consequently view the political and nonpolitical world and socialize their progeny from different perspectives. As a result, the offspring of divergent family status backgrounds develop distinctive types of social and political orientations.

Youth coming from families whose parents and/or grandparents recently immigrated to the United States (during the latter 19th and early 20th centuries) from low ethnic prestige countries, notably from Eastern and Southern Europe, Latin America, Puerto Rico, Asia and recent black mobiles from the American southland have been forced into precarious minority or marginal group existence which perpetuates and/or reinforces dependence on subcultural value systems.[3] Youth born into such homes are socialized, in part at least, into the traditional "old country" life styles, and depending on the time of arrival to the New World and exposure to American education and other "typically" American institutions, many families continue to identify with their ethnic-familial traditions. Because of both cultural and institutional segregation, which has been thrust upon America's ethnic minorities, members of such groups are pressed further into urban, or more recently suburban, ghettos which, in effect, forces them to depend almost entirely on political machines, boss politics or bloc voting--the traditional forms of ethnic-based urban politics--for political representation. The great majority of the newly-arrived ethnic groups are ranked low or near the bottom on the scale of ethnic prestige and political power in America today, while the more traditional settlers are ranked at the top (Elkin, 1968:46-56; Banfield and Wilson, 1963:63-167; Lipset, 1966:390-394; Baltzell, 1964).

Similarly, religious identification and organizations in the United States are ranked according to their membership size and degree of perceived prestige and institutional status--with low status cults and groups of atheists and agnostics competing with intermediate status Judaism and Roman Catholicism versus high status Protestantism. Generally speaking, acceptability into "legitimate" American society today is determined, in part at least, upon one's professed religious affiliation, with rudimentary institutional authority, visibility and mobility given to the minority religious groups in a predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant dominated social order (Baltzell, 1964). As a result, minority religious groups remain loyal to their socio-religious heritage primarily as reinforcing and identity maintaining mechanisms--that is, in terms of their religious morality, values, rituals, styles or recreation, occupational and educational aspiration, kinship affiliation and traditions in general--which affect both child rearing practices and identification within and attachment to the political community. The effect of religion on socialization and politics is a well known phenomenon in sociology (Lipset, 1963a; Lipset, 1968c:169-176; Lenski, 1961; Yinger, 1963; Vernon, 1962).

Political affiliation is ranked in the United States in terms of its perceived legitimacy and effectiveness (Lipset, 1963a). While the American two-party system remains the dominant form of rational or organized politics today, in many instances political power and authority are dependent upon financial influence and industrial power. As a result, socialists, radical democrats, third parties, right-wing and most minority political groups in general are ranked low on the scale of political legitimacy and efficacy, while the Republican business community, old wealth, and to a lesser extent mobile nouveau riche Democrats, the latter of whom manage to sustain electoral support, rank at the top or near the apex of political power in this country (Lubell, 1965; Domhoff, 1967; Keller, 1968). Although liberal and radical elements may occasionally exhibit party and tactical advantages, the balance of power in this political struggle favors the conservatives. As Lipset (1968c:314) noted, the center of gravity of wealth and power in the United States is on the Republican side, while the center of gravity of poverty is on the Democratic side.

While the literature on family status and socialization is not consistent, we nonetheless can summarize the following from the previous discussion. All of our family status characteristics exhibit hierarchical differences which influence styles of family socialization. However, only in the case of social class are we able to uncover in the literature explicit causal relationships between differential class position and democratic-authoritarian styles of family socialization.[4] While there is little information explicitly or implicitly articulating the asymmetric relationship between the family status variables of ethnicity, religion and politics as they affect patterns of family socialization, we will force our analysis to control for these additional family status dimensions as they presumably affect styles of family socialization.

SOCIALIZATION AND STUDENT POLITICS

The importance of socialization in developing the basic personality patterns and political identification of its children is a well documented area of research in political sociology.[5] In his much quoted work entitled Political Socialization, Hyman (1959:70-71) wrote of early family influence on the development of later political activity in their progeny. In comparing a series of 12 studies on the agreement and politically relevant views among parents and children, from one-half to three-fourths of these works, conducted independent of one another, revealed marked agreement between political views of both generations. Political consistency extending over several generations was found also to exist in the studies of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1964), Easton and Hess (1962: 229-246), Nogee and Levin (1958:449-463), Havemann and West (1952), Weltman and Remmers (1946:1-52) and by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet

(1948). In the studies by Nogee and Levin (who revealed that about 70% of Boston University students who voted for the first time in the 1956 national election adhered to the party of their parents, 1958:449-463), Campbell et al. (1964), and by Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), approximately three-fourths of the respondents surveyed reported consistent political attitudes between the two generations.

In his pioneering study of political socialization, Children and Politics, Greenstein (1965) explored the relationship of family dynamics to political values and commitment in a sample of 600 New Haven school children. In tracing the relationship between early family socialization and the political views of their progeny, three major sources of family-based political valuation emerged: (1) the civic instruction inculcated in children by explicit family instruction or open discussion; (2) the implicit or inadvertent learning that transpires when youth share socio-political experiences and political rituals with parents; and (3) selective media exposure (television, radio, newspapers and journals) within their homes (Greenstein, 1965).[6]

Changes in intergenerational party preference have been known to occur, but they tend to be conditional rather than normative. For example, Middleton and Putney (1963:377-383) discovered that when college youth perceived their parents as uninterested in politics, their affective salience toward parents did not influence their agreement with the political views of their parents. And conversely, when college youth perceived their parents as interested in politics, their affective attachment toward their parents correlated highly with the degree of agreement with their parents' political views.[7] In another study, Maccoby, Mathews and Morton (1954:23-39) revealed when young voters perceived their parents as having controlled them rather harshly when they were younger, they were more likely to desert their parents' party than those youth who reported receiving moderate parental control. Still, these authors reported that in 86% of the cases where the parents were of the identical party, children tended to choose and support that same party.

More recently, Keniston (1968) discovered that student political activists on the whole were not rebelling against the values and ideologies of their parents. On the contrary, he found in clinical interviews with a Vietnam Summer group at Harvard University that many of these youth were "living out" their parents' values in practice. Flacks' (1967:52-75) research reported that political activists indeed were somewhat closer to their parents' values than nonactivists. And Solomon and Fishman (1964: 54-73) suggested that civil rights and peace demonstrators were ipso facto "acting out" the values their parents had taught them in the home and by which they expected them to live.

In addition, Keniston (1968:306-310) and Flacks (1967:52-75) described the democratic and equalitarian styles of family decision-making in the homes of left-wing student activists. They discovered that the dominant ethos of (leftist) activist prone families was equalitarian, permissive, democratic and highly individuated. According to these authors, leftist middle-class families placed a high premium on democratic problem-solving, self-expression, intellectual independence and avowed freedom of dissent. Leftist student activists came from homes where parents share equally in decision-making, where disagreement was openly expressed and negotiated rather than submerged and where one would expect sanctioned argumentation at family gatherings. As Keniston noted in studying youth from protest prone families:

> We might expect that these will be families where children talk back to their parents at the dinner table, where free dialogue and discussion of feelings is encouraged, and where rational solutions are sought to everyday family problems and conflicts. We would also expect that such families would place a high premium on self-expression and intellectual independence, encouraging their children to make up their own minds and to stand firm against group pressure. (Keniston, 1968:310)

Conversely, it is believed, although less empirical evidence supports the hypothesis, that student political activists coming from conservative homes have been exposed to less democratic, less permissive and less demonstrative or self-expressive backgrounds than their liberal counterparts (Block, Haan and Smith, 1968:198-231).

In summary, research has indicated that a causal relationship exists between family socialization, with such factors as parental decision-making and parent-progeny argumentation, affecting the direction of student politics. First, it has been demonstrated that equalitarian or democratic styles of parental decision-making were related to left-wing student politics, while authoritarian or less democratic family environments were more prevalent among right-wing student activists. Second, left-wing student activists more often than not were found to come from homes where self-expression, disagreement, dissent or talking back to one's parents was permitted and even encouraged. Right-wing youth, in one study at least, were discovered to come from less expressive and demonstrative backgrounds. In general, the literature on socialization and student politics revealed that political activist youth, whether left or right, were living out the values and ideologies learned in the home.

FAMILY STATUS AND STUDENT POLITICS

The literature on family status and student politics presents relatively consistent findings concerning status characteristics of left- and right-wing student samples. In previous research, class unequivolcally was seen to be related to student politics. Lyonns (1965:519-529), Flacks (1967:52-75), Paulus (1968), Kahn (1968), and Keniston (1968:306-310) all noted the generally upper-middle-class composition of their left-wing student samples, while Evans (1961:42-65) described his right-wing conservative sample as typically coming from lower-middle- and respectable-working-class homes. Although relatively little has been said concerning the ethnic status composition of the various student activist samples studied in the past, Flacks (1967) and Kahn (1968) did make reference to the low ethnic status backgrounds exhibited by many of the left-wing students in their respective samples. In addition, Kahn (1968) noted the predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon background of the nonactivist students in his study. Religion likewise was found to be related to the direction of student politics. Solomon and Fishman (1964), Keniston (1968) and Kahn (1968) described their left-wing student samples as having a disproportionate number of students from Jewish, Protestant or minority religious backgrounds; while Solomon and Fishman (1964) and Braungart (1966) noted the strongly Christian religious backgrounds of their politically conservative student samples. And finally, a rich literature exists suggesting the generational consistency between parents' political affiliation and status and the political profiles and activities of their offspring. Lyonns

(1965), Keniston (1968), Solomon and Fishman (1964), and others pointed to the politically liberal views of the parents of left-wing activists, while Solomon and Fishman (1964), Schiff (1964) and Evans (1961) noted their right-wing activist samples more often than not described their parents as Republican.

From the above discussion we can surmise that each of our family status dimensions is related asymmetrically to the direction of student politics. That is, upper-middle-class, low ethnic, low (minority) religious and politically liberal family status characteristics are directly related to liberal or left-wing student political activism; while lower-middle-class position, high ethnicity, high religious status and politically conservative family backgrounds are associated with conservative or right-wing political activity.

Past research on family socialization and student politics has emphasized the importance of social class as one of the crucial or salient factors influencing equalitarianism, self-expression and student political activism, but in fact, this line of reasoning may prove to be spurious since other structural, or in our case family status variables indeed may explain the process equally as well. As Lipset (1968a:49-51; 1968b:12-14) has cautiously pointed out, while the majority of studies on student political activism are relatively consistent (i.e., that politically involved youth are reared in democratic or authoritarian atmospheres, activist youth are more intelligent than nonactivist youth, et cetera), such findings are inconclusive and unconvincing at this time, because they fail to hold constant sociological and politically relevant factors in the backgrounds for such students. For example, such studies report:

> That leftist activists tend to be the offspring of permissive families as judged by child rearing practices, and of families characterized by a strong mother who dominates family life and decisions. Conversely, conservative activists tend to come from families with more strict relationships between parents and children, and in which the father plays a dominant controlling role. But to a considerable extent these differences correspond to little more than the variation reported in studies of Jewish and Protestant families. Childhood rearing practices tend to be linked to socio-cultural-political outlooks. To prove that such factors play an independent role in determining the political choices of students, it will first be necessary to compare students within similar ethnic, religious and political-cultural environments. This has not yet been done. (Lipset, 1968a:49-51; 1968b:13)

In response to Lipset's suggestion, we intend to hold constant and/or compare the family status characteristics of social class, ethnicity, religion and politics under the rubric family status as they affect certain aspects of family socialization which in turn relate to the direction of student politics. This of course moves the plane of investigation from a bivariate, symmetric level of analysis to a multivariate, asymmetric level of analysis, as family status, socialization and student politics variables are controlled simultaneously in a closed causal field between select independent, intervening and dependent variables.

FAMILY STATUS, SOCIALIZATION AND STUDENT POLITICS

The (1) relationship between family status and socialization; (2) the association between what we have defined as socialization and student politics; and (3) the relationship between family status and student politics is presented in the following fashion. Information on the association between family status and socialization is not as extensive as some of the other relationships under investigation. As alluded to previously, many authors have discussed the relationship between social class as it influences patterns of socialization, with middle-class children being exposed to democratic and equalitarian families more often than not. Evidence also supports the view that one's ethnic status family background has an effect on styles of socialization which is conditioned in terms of time of arrival to the New World and institutional assimilation of fellow ethnic group members. Unfortunately, relatively little is known empirically concerning the democratic and argumentative patterns of the various ethnic groups, but it is presumed that those ethnic groups conditioned by low occupational and educational positions would exhibit less democratic exposure and be drawn from less expressive families. Likewise, little information is available in the literature concerning the relationship between religious status and family socialization, but we can again assume that those religious groups with the more educated and professional memberships would exhibit more democratic and argumentative family structures, since this seems to be the case in the general population when compared on these variables. And finally, the relationship between politics and democratic family socialization has not been explored in depth in the literature, but we could extrapolate from the previous works that those families inculcating civic awareness and explicit family political instruction by open discussion and exposing their youth to diverse and crucial media would produce more democratic, less authoritarian and more expressive progeny. Again, we might suspect the more politically aware parents would be those with higher education and occupations. Many of these questions must be left for further investigation.

It is the general assumption of this paper that the direction of student activism can be explained in terms of family status dimensions and the previously discussed aspects of socialization. Yet, the linkage has not been made explicit in the research literature concerning ethnic, religious, family political status and socialization and will only partially be made in the present analysis of socialization and student politics research. However, in the asymmetric relationship between select aspects of socialization and student activism, we are fortunate to have more information at hand for analysis, especially with respect to democratic family structure of leftist student activist homes. Studies in this area have uncovered the causal linkage between democratic or equalitarian interaction between parents in styles of family decision-making and the democratic or expressive parent-progeny relationship in the frequency of family argumentation as these factors affected left-wing student behavior. It is assumed the obverse is true with regard to right-wing youth.

Then again, when studying the relationship between what we have defined as family socialization and student politics, we have not developed fully the linkages that are presumed to exist between the family status dimensions and student politics. Fortunately, there is a plethora of literature explaining this latter causal phenomenon. For example, a strong asymmetric association was found to exist between upper-middle-class family status and left-wing student politics, while right-wing youth more often than not come from lower-middle- and respectable-working-class homes. Several researchers pointed to a clear relationship between low ethnic family status background and left-wing student group orientation. With respect to religious status, a correlation was discovered between what we have defined as low family religious background and left-wing student activism. The relationship between family political status, political values and styles of student politics was found to exist in numerous studies.

The foregoing and other studies suggest the importance of the family in the political socialization process. The family is viewed here as a mediating institution strategically situated between the struggles of society in general and the political socialization process of contemporary college youth in particular. Family status is established by its: (1) social class, (2) ethnic, (3) religious, and (4) political anchorages, which collectively are defined as the independent variable(s) in our theoretical model. While there undoubtedly is some overlap and semantic coagulation between these four independent concepts or test variables, it is believed, and empirical evidence supports the view, that each social structural or family status dimension has considerable conceptual autonomy and independent variability (see for example, the arguments developed by Barber, 1961:3-10; and Lenski, 1954:401-413). We intend to define select aspects of socialization, the intervening variable(s), through the concept of democratic family structure. Democratic family structure is defined further in terms of: (1) parental decision-making (equalitarian or democratic versus authoritarian) and (2) the frequency of family political argumentation occurring between the parents and their offspring (or a measure of verbal dissent denoting freedom in the family for the offspring to talk back or freely express themselves when their views conflict with the views of their parents).[8] We of course realize and admit that our definition of socialization is neither inclusive, exhaustive nor is it indicative of the general literature that exists under the rubric of socialization in sociology. Nevertheless, these dimensions or aspects of socialization, parental decision-making and family argumentation, have been employed in the general analyses of socialization and student politics, and therefore we intend to incorporate these concepts into our definition of family socialization. Based on previous findings, we have seen that families socialize their progeny and provide the basic cognitive, affective, moral and political values preparing their youth for entrance into adult society. Thus, both independent and intervening variables are conceptualized as influencing the direction and style of the offspring's student politics, the dependent variable in our study, which is defined in terms of: (1) student group membership, or (2) political identification. The question remains, when applying this theoretical model to our sample, what are the causal and infra-structural linkages that exist between select indices of family status and socialization as such factors affect the political behavior of contemporary college youth?[9]

THE STUDENT SAMPLE

One hundred nine College Young Democrats (YD), 117 Young Republicans (YR), 248 members from the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and 215 Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), representing mainstream and radical positions on both the college political left and right, have been surveyed from 10 major eastern colleges and universities and from two national samples of SDS and YAF. These four groups were chosen for study inasmuch as they represent the gamut of legitimate and radical political elements encountered on most American college and university campuses today; they are the largest campus-based political activist groups in the United States; and they best articulate the changing political anchorages, cleavages and conflicts (over major substantive issues) that have emerged with such dramatic force during the decade of the 1960's.

During the academic year 1966-1967, student political leaders representing the four groups selected for study were contacted at 10 major eastern universities; the study was described to them; authorization was secured to survey constituent group members; dates were confirmed for administration of the questionnaire; and local chapters were subsequently surveyed _en masse_ periodically throughout the academic year. The rationale for selecting the schools included in the sample was based on sheer size of the institution (in terms of enrollment), its urban-rural setting, academic status or prestige, and the funds available for research. Fortunately, two national conventions of SDS and YAF were held during the data collecting phase of the study (SDS held a national convention at Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio, while YAF held its convention at Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pennsylvania), and their respective delegates were included in our sample.[10] The Pennsylvania State University, Temple University, University of Pittsburgh, University of Maryland, and Harpur University (the State University of New York at Binghamton) were chosen for study because they represent large state universities from both urban and rural regions. Harpur, the exception here, is a medium-size state institution. City University of New York and Brooklyn College were included for study inasmuch as they represent medium-size institutions in a major metropolitan area. The University of Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University and Carnegie-Mellon University exemplify elitist and specialized institutions with highly selective admissions policies. The 10 institutions, then, represent significant differences in size, ecological recruitment base, public or private status, academic ranking and differential student body selectivity.[11]

While the sample of campus politicoes represents student politics in terms of direction and intensity of involvement, it fails to provide a base line or anchoring criteria upon which to compare our political groups with a nonpolitical student population. Therefore, an additional number of 557 Introductory Sociology students, that is, students not holding membership in our four groups, was collected for study from the City University of New York, University of Maryland, Penn State University and Temple University. This sample of apoliticals, more typical of the college population in general, serves as the Control Group (CG) to: (1) establish a normative base upon which to generalize and extrapolate to a nonpoliticized college population, and (2) to provide a neutral criterion for comparative analysis between left- and right-wing student activists.

When our four student activist groups and Control Group were compared by sex, age, father's education, father's occupation, father's income, year in college, grade point average (GPA), major and occupational aspiration of respondents, the following group characteristics and profiles resulted.

SDS has more female members than the right-wing groups in our sample, but like YD, is still two-thirds male in sex composition. SDS tend to be older and upperclassmen, with over one-third of their members 21 years of age or older and almost two-thirds juniors or above. SDS has more graduate students than the other four groups. The great majority of the SDS major in the social sciences, humanities (as do the YD) and creative or fine arts (no other group was interested in the creative arts). Although very few major in education, one-third plan to be teachers, still fewer plan on becoming social scientists, entering creative expressive fields, and planning on careers in radical politics and community development (the only student group interested in this career). They have no intention of being businessmen, natural or physical scientists or entering the medical professions. SDS have high GPA's (like YAF) with the majority of the group earning "B" averages or better. Their fathers have advanced degrees with the modal category falling in the graduate professional category. Over two-thirds of the fathers of SDS members have been exposed to some college, which is the highest percentage of all our groups. Fathers of these youth also have high prestige occupations, with over four-fifths holding jobs in the administrative or higher occupational categories. The income of SDS is the second highest for all our groups, second only to the YR.

YD are similar to SDS in sex composition albeit they are younger and drawn from underclassmen. Like the YR, the YD major in social science, humanities and business. None of the YD majored in the physical sciences and only one youth majored in creative arts. Similar to YR and YAF, YD plan to be businessmen, lawyers, and enter the teaching, political, military and government fields. Their GPA's are similar to YR with the modal category falling in the "C+" range. The education of their fathers is not as high as the education of SDS or YR fathers, but YD have slightly fewer fathers who have attended graduate school than their radical left-wing ally. YD are similar to YR in having about the same number of fathers who attended partial high school or less (slightly under one-fifth). Their fathers tend to be administrators with medium-high incomes. They do not exhibit extreme demographic background characteristics when compared with the other groups in our sample.

The Control Group is overrepresented with females (slightly over one-half). It is the youngest of the five groups, composed primarily of freshmen and sophomores. These apolitical youth are average students ("C" students) academically, having the lowest GPA scores of any group in our sample, and major in education, social science, the humanities and business. They plan to pursue careers in teaching, business-legal areas and social science. Like the YD, YR and YAF, the Control Group members are not interested in altruistic or radical careers, nor do they have a strong interest in political, military and government jobs. The Control Group resembles YAF with respect to father's education, occupation (lower status) but have higher incomes than YAF. In terms of income, the fathers of the Control Group members are no different from SDS and YD fathers.

YR are the same age as the YD, with almost four-fifths of their members 20 years of age or younger. There are slightly more upper-classmen in YR than in YD, and the YR major more often than not in social science, humanities and business. More than any other group under investigation, the YR plan to enter business, legal, political-military-government and teaching careers. They are not interested in creative expressive, altruistic or radical pursuits. Similar to the YD, the YR are "C+" students. Their fathers' modal education category is college graduate with approximately one-sixth earning degrees beyond the bachelors level. Like the YD, their fathers are administrators, business managers and high executives with the greatest percentage falling in the higher executive category. In this respect, they closely resemble the occupational structure of SDS fathers. The income level for YR is highest for all groups.

YAF is male dominated with fewer females than any of the activist groups under study. It is the youngest of our activist groups, comprised primarily of freshmen. YAF tend to major in the social sciences, business and the humanities. They have more of a diversified range of majors than the other groups with students majoring in engineering, biological sciences and education. YAF members plan to enter the business-legal, teaching, political-military-government and natural science fields. Although the great majority of YAF major in social science, only a small number plan to be social scientists. Like SDS, the YAF have high GPA's with the majority of their members coming from the "B" bracket. They resemble the Control Group in having fathers with low prestige occupations, with YAF fathers having less education and lower incomes than all groups in our sample.[12]

The demographic characteristics in the backgrounds of our student sample are highly consistent with previous research findings on student political activists. The sex and age composition of our activist groups are homologous with the findings by Schiff (1964), Lyonns (1965), and Keniston (1968). Father's education, occupation and income characteristics of our sample square with the research on youth activists undertaken by Watts and Whittaker (1966), Lyonns (1965), Flacks (1967), Kahn (1968), Evans (1961) and Paulus (1968). And finally, data on year in college, GPA and major are congruous with the findings by Selvin and Hagstrom (1965), Solomon and Fishman (1964), Flacks (1967), Heist (1966), and Somers (1965).

OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL

Although most of the research conducted in the area of student politics has focused ostensibly on leftist political activist students, the present paper tests the total range of these political views, that is, with apolitical students, mainstream activists and activists at the conservative end of the political spectrum as well. This paper attempts to formalize and specify the causal linkages that exist between select independent family status conditioners as they affect styles of democratic family structure which presumably intervene or bear on the direction of campus-based politics. Operationally then, family status is defined as our independent variable which provides the milieu and sets the style for family upbringing. Socialization, as determined by democratic family structure, is operationalized as our intervening variable, and direction of student political activism is operationalized as our dependent variable. Both independent and intervening variables are employed to predict and explain variance in the dependent variable. For uniformity, nominal and ordinal testing procedures are scaled from low (or low status) to high (or high status). This provides directional consistency in reading both the gammas and correlation-regression coefficients.

Dependent Variable: Student Politics

Student Political Group Membership and Identification (X_1): Conceptually, refers to the active participation in and/or identification with radical or conventional political behavior while attending college based on the conceptual scheme of: (1) Revolutionary-Radical Left; (2) Practical Left and Liberal Center; (3) Apolitical Center; (4) Sophisticated Conservatives and Practical Right; and (5) Radical-Revolutionary Right.[13] Operationally, these political labels are viewed as homologous with active student membership in: (1) SDS (Students for a Democratic Society); (2) YD (Young Democrats); (3) CG (Control Group of apolitical nonactivist students); (4) YR (Young Republicans); and (5) YAF (Young Americans for Freedom).

In addition, ideological direction of student political identification is ordinally-intervally scaled from revolutionary left to revolutionary right based on the conceptual scheme corresponding to a subject's identification with: (1) Gus Hall and (2) Mario Savio (revolutionary radicals); (3) Staughton Lynd and (4) Norman Thomas (radicals); (5) Hubert Humphrey and (6) Robert Kennedy (liberals); (7) Walter Lippmann and (8) Harry Truman (conservative liberals); (9) Nelson Rockefeller and (10) Dwight Eisenhower (liberal conservatives); (11) Richard Nixon and (12) Everett Dirksen (conservatives); (13) Barry Goldwater and (14) William F. Buckley, Jr. (reactionaries); (14) Robert Welch and (16) George Lincoln Rockwell (revolutionary radicals).[14] The rank-order correlation reliability index of this political identification profile scale, which was developed in 1966, has been predetermined by a series of judges at $r = .95$. While the nominally-ordinally scaled group continuum of our five student groups is employed for descriptive analysis, the ordinally-intervally scaled political identification profile is employed in path analysis. Essentially, both group membership and political identification dimensions tap the same phenomenon: direction of student politics. The reliability of these two scaled items with each other is $r = .83$ (significant at .01).

Intervening Variable: Socialization (Democratic Family Structure)

Parental Decision-Making (X_2): Conceptually, refers to style of parental decision-making (democratic versus authoritarian) exhibited in the families of our student sample. Operationally, parental decision-making is defined as: (1) Authoritarian (father or mother makes all decisions in family); (2) Authoritarian-Democratic (father or mother makes most of important decisions); and (3) Democratic (both father and mother share equally in family decision-making).

Family Argumentation (X_3): Conceptually, refers to the frequency of argumentation of offspring with one or both parents over the substantive issues of civil rights, the distribution of wealth and American foreign policy. Operationally, frequency of argumentation with one or both parents is defined in terms of a composite index score based on the weightings: 2-Often argued; 1-Occasionally argued; 0-Practically Never argued. The collapsed scale adopted for our purposes consists of: (1) Low (composite argument index scores of 0-1); (2) Medium (argument index scores of 2-4); and (3) High (argument index scores ranging between 5-6).

Independent Variable: Family Status

Social Class (X_4): Conceptually, refers to families who share similar life styles with respect to occupational and educational backgrounds in the social stratification hierarchy. Operationally, it is defined by the Hollingshead Index of Social Position which combines scores on the Edwards 7-point occupational prestige scale with a 7-point education scale (Hollingshead, 1957). For purposes of the paper, the Hollingshead Classes IV and V are collapsed and defined as the (1) Working Class; Class III is defined as the Lower-Middle Class; and Classes I and II as the (3) Upper-Middle Class.

Ethnicity (X_5): Conceptually, refers to groups bound together by similar cultural and nationality ties who are the products of similar historic evolution, social organization and migration to the United States. Operationally, it is defined as ethnic status relative to geographic or nationality origin. Low ethnic status categories include: (1) English-Eastern or Southern European, (2) Eastern European-German, (3) Irish-Eastern or Southern European, (4) Italian, (5) Eastern European and (6)

Afro-American and/or West Indian. High ethnic status categories include the more traditional or earlier immigrants: (1) English, Scotch-Irish, Welsh, (2) German, French, Scandinavian, Dutch, (3) English-German, (4) English-Irish, (5) Irish-Northern European and (6) Irish.

Parents' Religious Affiliation (X_6): Conceptually, refers to formal religious affiliation of one or both parents. Operationally, it is classified into four rank categories from low to high status based on minority-majority membership and institutional dominance in this country: (1) Nonreligious including parents who are agnostics or atheists; (2) Jewish (one or both parents); (3) Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox (one or both parents); and (4) Protestant parents.

Parents' Political Affiliation (X_7): Conceptually, refers to the organization, party or political label best articulating the spectrum of political ideologies in the families of our collegiate sample. Operationally, it is scaled from liberal to conservative according to the following categories: (1) Radical Left including radical, socialist, communist; (2) Moderate Left including Democrats; (3) Independent; (4) Moderate Right defined as Republican; and (5) Radical Right including conservative and right-wing groups.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

While the findings of past studies explaining student political activism have been consistent empirically with one another, they have not been altogether clear regarding the causal logic employed in their conceptual or theoretical explanations. In most cases, the authors have been content to work out of simple, bivariate symmetric models, while few if any have attempted to approach their theoretical and conceptual problems working out of multivariate causal frameworks, and of course, this is our major criticism of the research conducted thus far in this area.[15] In this paper the attempt is made to explore and further clarify the causally blurred relationship between family status background variables, socialization and student activism, through the employment of two causal measures--the Goodman and Kruskall gamma[16] and the Wright-Duncan technique of path analysis.[17]

The highest level of measurement our data can reach is ordinal. Therefore, in describing the bivariate causal relationships between indices of the independent, intervening and dependent variables, the Goodman and Kruskall gamma (the only ordinal proportionate reduction in error, or P-R-E, measure according to Costner, 1965:350) is employed, while the multivariate treatment of our data utilizes path analysis. This second causal technique is concerned with linear, additive,[18] asymmetric relationships among a selected set of variables which are assumed to be intervally scaled (although sometimes only in a hypothetical sense). Each dependent variable is regarded as determined by some combination of the preceding endogenous variables in the system. Or, when it is not possible to explain all the variation in the dependent variable, residual variables (or what Blalock, 1968:167, calls "error terms") may be introduced. Each residual is assumed to be "uncorrelated with any of the immediate determinants of the dependent variable to which it pertains," (Duncan, 1966:5) and in addition, each residual is presumed to be uncorrelated with any other residual in the system.[19] From the regressions in the recursive equations, estimates of the postulated path and correlation coefficients may be derived (Land, 1969:28). Path analysis has the unique advantage of being able to handle determining variables which are themselves intercorrelated.

Path diagrams are constructed by one-way arrows which form a straight line from the determining variable to the intervening and/or dependent variable that it is presumed to affect. Each line articulates a number called a path coefficient (p), which generally is the appropriate beta coefficient (standardized regression coefficient) between any two variables. The path coefficient contains a subscript of two numbers--the first subscript indicates the dependent variable, while the second number represents the variable having the direct effect on the dependent variable.[20] Only those beta coefficients which prove to be significant are indicated in the model by a one-way arrow.[21] Nonsignificant lines are erased and the regression recomputed deleting those variables from the model which have no significance or little causal relevance. In addition to exploring the direct effects of the independent and intervening variables on the dependent variable, it is possible to test for the total and specific indirect effects among the determining variables themselves through the expansion of the general path formula (Land, 1969:15-37). In this paper we utilize gammas to describe the bivariate relationship between our variables; while path analysis tests the multivariate relationship between: (1) the independent family status variables social class, ethnicity, parents' religion and political affiliation, as they simultaneously affect or explain variation in (2) the intervening variables of parental decision-making and family political argumentation, which in turn, determine and/or explain (3) variation in the dependent variable, political identification among college students.

RESEARCH FINDINGS: BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE

Bivariate

The democratic family structure and family status characteristics of our sample are described in Tables 1-6 in a simple bivariate fashion. In Tables 1 and 2 we note the differences in the parental decision-making and argumentation styles of our five student groups.

Tables 1 and 2 about here

In Table 1 we can see there is a positive relationship between parental decision-making and student political activism. The chi-square is significant at the .01 level; that is, we would expect a similar relationship to exist in the general student population. Students on the political left, from SDS and YD, more often than not, come from democratic homes where the parents share equally in making family decisions (60.7% for SDS and 57.2% for YD), whereas students on the political right are about equally devided between those coming from democratic homes (44.9% for YR and 40.4% for YAF) and those coming from authoritarian-democratic homes where one parent is more likely to make most of the family decisions (41.3% for YR and 42.5% for YAF). The Control Group falls between the left- and right-wing groups with regard to parental decision-making in that the parents are somewhat less democratic than the SDS and YD parents but more democratic than YR and YAF parents. Although less than 20% of the total student sample indicate they come from authoritarian homes--where one parent makes all the decisions--YAF has the highest percentage (17.1%) of all groups in this category. The gamma of -.1637 is not particularly strong[22] since many students from all groups come from democratic homes, but we can detect a noticable trend, with more leftist oriented students recruited from democratic homes than their conservative counterparts.

In Table 2 there appears to be a difference in the frequency of family political argument among our five student groups. The chi-square is significant at the .001 level, indicating that this "as if" relationship exists in a probability sense in the general activist and nonactivist student population-at-large. Overall, activists tend to argue politics with their parents more frequently than nonactivists. The majority of youth in the activist groups (from 40% to 60%) fall in the medium argue category, while the majority of the Control Group youth (50.4%) are in the low argument category. SDS has by far the highest percentage (31.7%) of all groups in the high argue category, followed by YD (11.1%), YR (10.3%), YAF (9.5%) and Control Group (6.9%). YR has the highest percentage of the activist groups in the low argue category (41.4%), followed closely by YAF (40.0%). The gamma for this relationship is -.2214 (which is higher than the parental decision-group relationship), and we note a nonmonotonic relationship, with left-wing political activist youth arguing more frequently with their parents than right-wing youth, keeping in mind the notion that activist youth tend to be more vocal and tenacious in voicing their political views than nonactivists and unruffled conservatives.

The family status characteristics of our five student groups are described in Tables 3-6. There are significant social class differences

Tables 3-6 about here

in the composition of the five student groups. The chi-square probability test of no relationship is significant at the .001 level. As can be seen from Table 3, SDS members are from upper-middle-class homes predominantly (55.3%), with slightly over one-fourth of their membership (27.7%) from lower-middle-class families. Conversely, the right-wing YAF are drawn predominantly from working- (39.0%) and lower-middle-class homes (33.0%).

The class composition of YD and YR are similar, with slightly more YD (37.2%) from lower-middle-class homes than YR (28.8%) and more YR (48.7%) from upper-middle-class homes than YD (41.2%). The Control Group more closely resembles YAF with respect to social class background. The gamma of -.1999 is not high, but we have about a 20% chance of predicting group membership when we know the social class position of our student sample. Again, with an inverse gamma reading, we can note a relationship between upper-middle-class background and leftist student political activism. Presumably, the reason the gamma is not stronger is, while there exists a continuous rank in political position from liberal to conservative, there is no consistent linear or monotonic rank in social class. We begin with upper-class SDS, followed by middle- and upper-class YD, but then jump sharply to working-class Control Group members, back up to upper-class YR and down again sharply to working-class YAF. As a result, while the relationship between social class and student group membership appears significant and correlated, the form of the correlation is at best curvilinear or nonmonotonic. It is also of interest to note the sharp social class and political ideological cleavage between the two radical groups in our sample.

There is little doubt when viewing Table 4 that ethnicity appears to be related to student political activism. The chi-square for this relationship is significant at the .001 level and as we observe, distinct ethnic group differences indeed exist in the composition of the student groups, with leftist political activists drawn primarily from low status, Southern or Eastern European backgrounds, while the majority of right-wing student political activists come from higher status Northern European backgrounds. Over 60% of SDS and YD members are from low ethnic status families, while 60% to approximately 70% of YAF and YR are from high ethnic status families.

The Control Group in our sample more closely resembles SDS and YD, with 59.2% of these students from low ethnic status homes. The gamma for this table is .3495, indicating a strong monotonic relationship between high ethnic status and conservative student political activism. That is, students with low ethnic status backgrounds more often than not are drawn into left-wing student politics, while youth with high ethnic status backgrounds lean toward conservatism.

In viewing Table 5 we note a strong and significant relationship between parents' religious status and student group membership. The chi-square for this relationship is large and significant at the .001 level. The left-wing SDS group is predominantly Jewish (42.7%); it is the only group having a large number of members from Nonreligious homes (19.7%); and it has the lowest percentage of all five groups recruited from Catholic homes (9.6%). On the other hand, 83.6% of YAF students come from Christian homes; they have the highest percentage of youth drawn from Catholic backgrounds (32.2%), while they have the lowest percentage of members coming from Jewish homes (13.0%). The YD, like SDS, are recruited from Jewish homes (61.5%), the highest percentage in this category for all student groups. They are 20.2% Catholic and have the lowest percentage of all groups from Protestant religious backgrounds (14.6%). The YR have the highest percentage of all the groups in our study coming from Protestant homes (55.3%) and have one-fifth of their constituency from Jewish and one-fifth of their membership from Catholic homes. Interestingly, the plurality of youth in the Control Group come from Jewish homes (40.0%), with 29.2% from Protestant homes and 28.7% from Catholic homes. The gamma for this relationship is .3882 and we note youth from low religious status homes are more apt to be members of left-wing or liberal political groups, while those from high religious status homes are often right-wing or conservative group members.

Unquestionably, the relationship between family political status and student group membership is the strongest and most significant relationship we have encountered thus far. The chi-square for Table 6 is significant at the .001 level. Generally speaking, offspring follow the political direction of their parents. While SDS tend to be more radical than their parents (i.e., we note relatively few parents in the radical left category), YD and YR youth overwhelmingly follow their parents' political views, with 79.7% of YD coming from moderate or Democratic homes and 66.7% of YR youth coming from moderate right or Republican homes. The majority of SDS are recruited from moderate left and independent homes, while the majority of YAF are recruited from moderate right-wing and politically independent homes. Youth in the Control Group primarily come from moderate left and independent homes, which closely resembles the political family backgrounds of the SDS sample. The mainstream and apolitical students have less than 1% of their members having parents who hold radical views, while 13.6% of SDS parents are classified as radical left and 6.3% of YAF parents are classified as radical right. The largest percentage of politically independent parents are found in the radical left-wing, apolitical and radical right-wing student groups. The gamma for this table equals .5075 and is the strongest relationship we have encountered thus far for any family status variable influencing student political group affiliation. The slope of the relationship seems to be strongly monotonic, with family politics linearly related to student politics. It appears if we know the parents' political identification, we can predict fairly accurately the political affiliation of their offspring (at least 50% of the time in a bivariate sense). Children indeed tend to follow the politics of their parents, with liberal parents producing politically liberal youth and conservative parents producing politically conservative youth.

The descriptive data concerning the family status, democratic socialization characteristics and student politics of our sample supports the bulk of the literature regarding left- and right-wing college students (Flacks, 1967; Keniston, 1968; Paulus, 1968; Kahn, 1968; Solomon and Fishman, 1964; Schiff, 1964; Evans, 1961; Somers, 1965; Lyonns, 1965; Watts and Whittaker, 1966; Block, Haan and Smith, 1968). What has not been explored thus far are the possible interrelationships or the asymmetric associations among the variables themselves. This will be accomplished with path analysis.[23]

Multivariate

Path analysis is employed to test the multivariate relationship between family status, democratic family structure and student politics in an asymmetric and cummulative sense. Instead of comparing each of the independent variables with the intervening and dependent variables, as was the case with gamma analysis, path analysis tests the total relationship of the independent variables as they singly and collectively influence or explain variance in the intervening and dependent variables; while at the same time, the independent and intervening variables singly and collectively explain variance in the dependent variable. By employing this methodology we are better able to determine whether a proposed set of interpretations prove to be internally consistent in addition to being related both theoretically and empirically.[24]

Figure 1 about here

In Figure 1, we can immediately note that the ethnicity variable is eliminated from the path diagram. A preliminary run for this path diagram indicated a high zero-order correlation between ethnicity and political identification ($r = .264$, significant at .01).[25] Even though theoretically one would expect ethnicity to be related to the dependent variable, as was discussed previously and indicated by the high gamma, the beta coefficients for ethnicity-democratic family structure and ethnicity-political identification were not strong enough to warrant inclusion in the path model. Since the beta coefficient "controls out" the effects of all other variables in the system and allows only the independent variable to affect the dependent variable, then when all variables were controlled except ethnicity ($\beta_{15.23467} = .033$), ethnicity lost its explanatory power for political identification.[26] Through the expansion of the general path formula, it was possible to explore the direct effect of ethnicity on political identification along with the indirect effects of the other independent variables on ethnicity and thus determine more precisely which variables led to the attrition of ethnicity from our model. The direct effect of ethnicity (X_5) on political identification (X_1) was negligible (.033), as mentioned previously. However, the total indirect effects on ethnicity-political identification were high (.231), with family politics (.166) and religion (.068) having the strongest indirect effects on the ethnicity-political identification relationship. It appears that family politics-ethnicity, and religion-ethnicity indeed are highly interrelated, and when these interrelationships were controlled, ethnicity was unable to maintain its strength as a determining variable for student political identification. In light of this "contamination effect" we can assume that the strong gamma between ethnicity and student group membership was due to the underlying effects of politics and religion which inflated ethnicity's effect on student group affiliation.

The zero-order correlation matrix in Figure 1 indicates that the three remaining independent variables and two intervening variables all appear to be correlated significantly with our dependent variable. In addition, when observing the intercorrelations (zero-order correlations) of the independent family status variables, class, religion and politics, we can see that while religion and politics are highly correlated (r = .475), religion and class (r = -.031), and class and politics (r = .054) do not appear to be significantly interrelated. Therefore, there does appear to be some independence in our family status variables, especially between class and religion, and class and politics. Family argument and parental decision-making are not significantly correlated (r = .055), which implies some independent variation in these two variables.

Generally speaking, about 28.8% (significant at .01 level) of the variation in political identification can be explained by the combined influence of family politics (beta = .416), family argument (beta = -.134), religion (beta = .131), and social class (beta = -.126) in the total sample. Only 2.8% of the variation in family political argument score and 1.0% of the variation in parental decision-making can be explained by religion, with religion the only family status variable having any effect on democratic family structure. It appears that family religious status has a somewhat greater effect on family argumentation (beta = -.164) than on parental decision-making (beta = -.100), and as family religious status decreases, family argumentation and democratic decision-making increase.

We also observe in Figure 1, family argumentation depends somewhat on family religious status for its effect on political identification of college students, while parental decision-making does not have any significant effect on political identification. As with the gammas, family politics appears to be the strongest predictor variable influencing student political identification. The other variables in Figure 1 have about the same relative effect on political identification, all of which are considerably less than that of family politics. The direction of the path coefficients corroborates our earlier findings: (1) as social class decreases, political conservative identification increases; (2) as family religious status increases, political conservatism increases; (3) as family political conservatism increases, student conservative identification increases; and (4) as argument score decreases political conservatism increases. In addition to the direct effects on political identification, the indirect effects were computed for each of the diagram variables.[27] Religion was the only variable plagued by strong indirect effects (.224) which were due primarily to the influence of family politics on religion (.198).

We can surmise from Figure 1 that the family status variables of class, religion and politics, do not explain much variation in the socialization indices of family argument and parental decision-making, but the combination of the independent and intervening variables explain a substantial and statistically significant amount of variance in the dependent variable. Religion appears to be the strongest family status predictor of democratic socialization, while family politics appears to be the strongest predictor of student political identification.

When comparing the path diagrams for the activist groups, Figure 2, and Control Group, Figure 3, we are able to explain 38.7% (significant at .01

level) of the variation in political identification for the activist groups, and only 16.2% of the variation in political identification for the Control Group. Ethnicity was not a significant variable included in the path diagram for the activist group, while ethnicity, class and decision-making were eliminated from the path analysis in the Control Group. The activist model more closely resembles the path diagram for the total student sample in that an intervening variable provides a causal linkage between the independent and dependent variables, but unlike the total student sample, the crucial intervening variable for the activists is parental decision-making rather than argument score. An intervening variable does not provide a causal linkage for the Control Group.

Figures 2 and 3 about here

Family politics appears to be the strongest predictor variable for student political identification for both activist and Control Groups, albeit a stronger predictor in the path diagram for the activists (beta = .451) than for the Control Group (beta = .277). The reverse appears to be true for family religious status, with religion a stronger predictor of political identification for the Control Group (beta = .209) than for the activist youth (beta = .105). Religion affects family argumentation and not parental decision-making for the Control Group (beta = -.216), while religion affects parental decision-making (beta = -.125), not family argument score in the activist group. We can see religious and political background are the only relevant variables explaining political identification in the Control Group, with much of the variation unexplained.

In addition to the family status variables of religion and politics, several other variables have a significant asymmetric effect on the political identification of the activist group. For the activists, aside from family politics, social class is the next strongest predictor of political identification (beta = -.207), and as social class increases, leftist political identification increases. Argument score, which was not relevant to political identification in the Control Group, emerges as the third highest predictor of political identification in the activist group (beta = -.174), where as family argument over politics decreases, conservative political identification increases. Family religious status is the fourth highest predictor in the path diagram (beta = .105), with high religious status positively correlated with conservative political identification. And finally, parental decision-making, as influenced by religion (beta = -.125), has a slight effect on political identification (beta = -.085), with youth from low religious status homes having parents who share equally in decision-making, more likely than not indicating leftist political identification.[28]

Path analysis allows us to observe the systematic causal relationship between the independent variables on the intervening and dependent variables. In the case of the activist group, the net differential of explained variance between the independent, intervening and dependent variables is substantial, indicating a causal or sequential relationship, while the same relationship in the Control Group is less impressive. In both instances, however, politics appears to be the strongest predictor of group identification, followed by class, argument, religion and decision-making for the activist group, and religion for the Control Group. In terms of predicting democratic family structure, for all three path diagrams, religion appears to be the only independent variable influencing argument score for the total student group and Control Group path diagrams, while it is the sole predictor of parental decision-making in the activist path diagram. Therefore, while religion provides the strongest influence of all the family status variables on democratic family structure or family socialization,[29] politics provides the strongest explanatory argument for political identification in our sample.

DISCUSSION

By forcing the family status, socialization and student politics variables into a multivariate analysis, we begin to perceive logically, and presumably more clearly, that social class, religion, family politics and family argumentation appear to be related to student activism, as other research has suggested, although they are causally related in a particular way. For the total student sample, family politics, argumentation, religion and social class, in that order, affected student political identification, with family politics by far the strongest predictor variable explaining variation in student political identification. Such findings seem to indicate that the study of student politics in the past has overemphasized social class as being one of the most crucial determiners of democratic family socialization and student political group membership or identification, when in fact, this may not be the case at all. In terms of causal priority and amount of variation explained, social class appeared to be less important than family political and religious status in our research. What we are suggesting here is that a reevaluation of the strengths of the causal input variables may be in order if we are thinking in terms of developing a reliable and valid theory explaining and predicting student politics. In view of this discussion, it appears that future inquiry should focus on the value-orienting factor of parents' religious affiliation[30] as it affects patterns of family socialization, while further investigation might also be undertaken into the area of family political socialization[31] as it influences the intensity and direction of student political activism.

When the path analysis for the total student sample was controlled by activists versus nonactivists, the following results emerged. First, the variables in the activist model were able to explain more variation in student political identification than was the case for the total student and control path diagrams. Again, ethnicity was not considered a significant causal variable and therefore was dropped from both the activist and Control Group diagrams. The activist path diagram more closely resembled the total student sample in that politics, class, argumentation and religion all directly affected political identification, but unlike the total sample parental decision-making rather than family argument proved to be the more significant intervening socialization variable influenced by religion. Politics appeared to be the strongest determiner of student political identification in the Control Group, followed only by parents' religion. And interestingly, religion again was the only independent variable influencing family argument for the Control Group.

Path analysis takes us closer to understanding the relationship between our multivariate theory and data than is possible using simple bivariate tests. Unlike gamma analysis, path analysis allows one to observe the total explained and unexplained variation in the intervening and dependent variables through the use of coefficients of multiple determination and alienation. Secondly, when employing beta coefficients, we can control simultaneously for all variables in the theoretical system with the exception of the path regressions varying at that time. Generally path analysis provides a more internally consistent and sensitive discriminatory technique as evidenced when ethnicity was deleted from the path diagram due to its high interrelationship with politics and religion. By employing multivariate analysis we were able to see that parents' religious affiliation consistently explained more variation in our intervening democratic family structure variables of parental decision-making and family argumentation than any other independent family status variable in our model (keeping in mind the strong indirect effect politics exerted on religion). No matter which statistical technique was employed, family politics proved to be the strongest predictor variable of student politics in our sample.

In one respect we could say that the variables under investigation articulate an internally consistent model or theory. That is, the variables selected to measure family status, socialization and student politics are causally and empirically related to one another in a specific fashion, and these asymmetric relationships can be determined by either gamma or path analysis techniques. The causally related infrastructural components of this analysis provides us with a parsimonious and predictive model for what could be called our "middle-range" theory explaining family status, democratic family structure and student politics. Structurally, our theory resembles the path diagram in Figure 1, which states that:

1. Direction of student politics in a sample of SDS, YD, Control Group, YR and YAF members ($R^2_{1.2467} = .288$) is determined by parents' political identification ($p_{17} = .416$), family political argumentation ($p_{12} = -.134$), family religious status ($p_{16} = .131$), and social class ($p_{14} = -.126$), in that order, plus the variation

that cannot be explained by the endogenous variables in the system (R_a = .844). Or:

$$X_1 = p_{12}X_2 + p_{14}X_4 + p_{16}X_6 + p_{17}X_7 + p_aR_a$$

2. Family political argument score ($R^2_{2.6}$ = .028) is influenced by family religious status (p_{26} = -.164) plus the unexplained variation (R_b = .986). Or:

   $$X_2 = p_{26}X_6 + p_bR_b$$

3. Parental decision-making ($R^2_{3.6}$ = .010) is affected by family religious status (p_{36} = -.100) and the variation unexplained (R_c = .995). Or:

   $$X_3 = p_{36}X_6 + p_cR_c$$

The theory also predicts in an asymmetric sense that religious status affects parental decision-making and family argument score with religion and argument affecting student politics in an additive sense, and that family politics, religion and class directly affect the direction of student politics.

While our theory or causal model explains 28.8% of the variation in our dependent variable student politics, the majority of the variation remains unexplained. There are certain possible reasons why we are not explaining more variation in our dependent variable: (1) measurement error of the endogenous variables in the model due to sampling error; (2) imprecise operationalization of our indices (both logically and empirically) which fail to tap adequately the dimensions we appear to be testing; and (3) exclusion of significant exogenous variables that could explain more variation in student politics (Langton, 1969). Essentially, this problem of unexplained variance is one of content rather than form and will not be the concern of this paper. Future replication of our findings incorporating additional variables will provide the answers to the problem of unexplained variance.

FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While we have concentrated primarily on sociological or group-level variables in this study,[32] we have not included important social psychological or situational factors which presumably would explain more variation in our multivariate model. For example, we have not attempted to tap: (1) psychological or dispositional characteristics of our student sample (McLaughlin, 1969; Greenstein, 1968:1-13; Smelser, 1968:111-126; Singer, 1968:127-156); (2) opinion structures of our activists (radical and mainstream) versus nonactivists in terms of object appraisal, mediation of self-other, externalization of ego-defense (Smith, 1968:15-27);[33] (3) generalized ego-involvement and selective perception (Sherif and Hovland, 1965; Sherif and Sherif, 1967); and (4) cognitive dissonance (Geschwender, 1968:127-135),[34] all or part of which would have allowed us to explain more variance in student politics. Perhaps a future study of this nature will control simultaneously for sociological, social psychological and psychological variables, all within one theoretical framework (Parsons, 1961; Parsons and Shils, 1962).

There exists a series of general theories in political sociology which explain or attempt to explain the sources of student politics in the United States, and their discussion sheds further light on the understanding of this campus-based phenomenon. First among these is the generational alienation or revolt theory developed by Eisenstadt (1956) and more recently by Feuer (1969). Eisenstadt (1956:Chapter VI) notes that the youth-parent conflict is greatly exacerbated or intensifies during periods of rapid social change. When the transition from the status of youth with its ascriptive, solidarity, and particularistic orientations to the total or secular society based on achievement, competition and universalism, is not perceived by the former as being affected through legitimate and acceptable channels (i.e., such as when the multiversity is viewed as not performing its "proper" function in society), alienation and rebellion have been known to occur. Eisenstadt further maintains that student movements are reactions against the older generation whose culture has not been internalized sufficiently by younger age groups.

More recently Feuer (1969), in his book The Conflict of Generations, argues that student movements are universal phenomena born of vague, undefined emotions which seek certain issues for psychological release. Such youthful conflicts have their roots in "deep unconscious sources" which manifest themselves in the forms of altruism, idealism, revolt, and self-sacrifice for the higher cause, and in some instances, self-destruction. Feuer feels that there are several themes at the bottom of student movements and these are: (1) gerontocratic rigidity of the older generation and their inability to incorporate youth into the traditional political order; (2) feelings of "de-authorization" and that the older generation has failed morally, ethically and politically; (3) periods of apathy and hopelessness among the general population; and (4) the apocalyptic or teleological "carrier wave" of the true values for the future. Essentially Feuer is arguing that the "unconscious energy of youth" is trying to existentially manifest itself instead of the reverse and that this latent ideological ingredient has tended to shape the political expression of generational revolts throughout the world.

A second theory that has received some attention explaining student politics has been what Keniston (1968:45-48) calls the "red-diaper-baby theory." Unlike the generational conflict theory which maintains that youth are rebelling against their family and the older generation in terms of the "unconscious" oedipal hatred of sons toward their fathers, the red-diaper-baby theory, or what we prefer to call the political-diaper theory, maintains that student radicalism does not stem from hostility toward fathers, mothers or parental authority in general but that student activists are in fact living out and in some instances exaggerating the political views and beliefs learned in the home. Our research supports the political-diaper interpretation over the generational revolt theory in that family politics proved to be the strongest predictor variable in our theoretical model explaining the direction of student political activism on both the political left and right. Therefore, we cannot conclude, in the present study at least, that student activists are rebelling against the political views of their parents, when the reverse appears to be true.[35]

Our theory of family status, socialization and student politics falls within the general rubric of status politics theory which assumes that political conflict, especially in an industrialized, middle-class, pluralist society emerges as a direct result from differentiated and competing status hierarchies, loyalities and aspirations. Unlike traditional class politics which attempts to explain political ideologies on the left and right in terms of the distribution of wealth and maintaining the status quo or status quo ante, status politics refers to individuals or groups who desire to maintain or improve their position in society. Over 30 years ago Lasswell (1933:373-384) suggested that middle-class extremism has roots in a capitalistic society. More recently, Hofstadter (1963:75-95), Lipset (1963b:313-377), Bell (1963:47-73) and Kornhauser (1959) have corroborated this phenomenon. Hofstadter (1963:75-95) in his explanation of "pseudo-conservatives" found, as did Bell (1963:47-73), that right-wing political extremism is more apt to occur among the Anglo-Saxon Protestant, old-family types and the nouveau riche or rising middle class than among other strata in society. Lipset (1963b:313-377) and Kornhauser (1959) have explained the origins of the German and Italian Fascist parties, the Poujadists, Coughlinites, McCarthyites and Birchers in a similar fashion.

Status politics theory avers that political power and decision-making are the results of compromises mediated between various groups in the struggle over the allocation of prestige and power centering around: (1) social class or more generally the struggles over economic resources; (2) religion or the struggle over the implementation and solution of cultural values and moral issues; and (3) politics or the sharp cleavages that emerge between legitimate and effective forms of political organization (Gusfield, 1966:166-188). The ethnic struggle over one's Americanism also has provided various conflicting rationalizations and a quest for security and identity which began approximately 90 years ago in this country when the Anglo-Saxon ethnic hegemony became threatened by immigrant groups from Eastern and Southern European countries. Since that time, the Anglo-Saxon-Yankee Protestants have felt the pinch in their social position from the upward mobile minority groups. By now it is a well known phenomenon in political sociology that one's group affiliation with reference to these four or other status hierarchies directly influences the styles of expressive politics which in turn become vehicles for political harmony and change. Lenski (1954:405-413), Rush (1967:86-92) and Parkin (1968), among others, have demonstrated that political liberalism and political conservatism result from uncrystallized or differential social anchorages relative to a series of status characteristics in our social backgrounds. Lenski (1954:405-413) discovered political liberalism usually occurs with a combination of low ethnicity relative to high income, occupation and education. Excluding the ethnicity variable, Rush (1967:86-92) discovered that political conservatism, or right-wing extremism, occurred among those respondents in his study who exhibited uncrystallized status scores with respect to low education, high income and high occupation. In a study of the participants attending a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) rally in Britain, Parkin (1968:175-192) discovered that this left-wing youthful radical movement could be explained in terms of dissonant elements one step removed from the more fully institutionalized or functionally integrated sectors (business, industry, government) of society. He discovered CND members were drawn from the ranks of the highly educated and professional-humanistic occupational groups (teachers, clergy, architects, scientists and social workers), but who received low salaries disproportionate to the time and services they rendered to society. Under such circumstances CND members exhibited uncrystallized status positions which partially isolated them from the dominate cultural values in society.

It is our opinion that the status politics model is a useful approach in explaining the styles of student politics, however, this is accomplished partially in the institution of the family and more specifically, through the styles of family socialization exhibited in our student sample. For example, the left-wing SDS students more often than not were drawn from the upper-middle class albeit they exhibited low ethnic, religious and political family status characteristics. Conversely, the right-wing YAF radicals were drawn from the lower-middle and respectable-working classes but exhibited high ethnic, religious and political family status characteristics. The moderately liberal YD more closely resembled SDS in that they were reared in low ethnic-religious-political, lower- and upper-middle-class homes. The moderately conservative YR were drawn from homes which ranked highest on all status characteristics of the groups in our sample, while the Control Group came from homes which ranked low on all four status dimensions. In this respect, our findings are consistent with the status crystallization argument which assumes that uncrystallized status positions will predispose individuals to follow more radical political views. Within our student sample, the SDS and YAF exhibited somewhat more uncrystallized status positions than the moderate and apolitical groups. Thus, the family status characteristics in our student sample generally support status crystallization theory as it has appeared in the literature. However, status crystallization theory alone does not explain the strong relationship between family politics and the political views exhibited by college youth. What is occurring in our study is a combination of uncrystallized family status dimensions accompanying a strong correlation in the parent-to-progeny political views, both of which partially explain the origin and direction of student politics. In addition we have revealed that of the four family status variables employed in this paper, religion alone was able to explain variation in the selected aspects of family socialization which sequentially influenced the direction of student politics. In other words, the connection between these family status factors and student politics can be explained not only in terms of the strains created by status inconsistencies but rather as the result of youth who already have become politicized and socialized in a particular way.

The results of our investigation revealed: (1) approximately 30% of the total variance in direction of student politics could be explained by the endogenous variables in our model; (2) ethnicity was deleted from our path model due to its high interrelationship with family politics and parents' religion; (3) of all the variables employed, family politics proved the strongest predictor of the direction of student politics, with offspring closely following the political views of their parents; (4) both social class and family politics directly affected student politics but had no effect on socialization; and (5) religion alone was able to explain variance in the direction of student politics directly and sequentially through family political argumentation. Findings suggest that a reevaluation of the strengths of our causal imput variables may be in order if we are thinking in terms of the development of a reliable and valid theory explaining and predicting family status, socialization and student politics.

This basic assumption that middle-class youth movements are not oedipal revolts or class-based phenomenon per se but instead emerge, in part at least, from specific family status and socialization styles, is the central thesis of this paper. And while our findings generally are consistent with other research in the area of student politics, our theoretical conclusions are specific to our study and will have to be verified further by future research.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING

Parental Decision-Making	Group SDS	 YD	 CG	 YR	 YAF
Authoritarian	13.4	9.9	12.9	13.8	17.1
Authoritarian-Democratic	25.9	32.9	34.8	41.3	42.5
Democratic	60.7	57.2	52.3	44.9	40.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(216)	(91)	(512)	(109)	(193)

$x^2 = 22.1$, $p < .01$, gamma = -.1637

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY FAMILY POLITICAL ARGUMENT

Family Political Argument	Group SDS	 YD	 CG	 YR	 YAF
Low	24.7	28.7	50.4	41.4	40.0
Medium	43.6	60.2	42.7	48.3	50.5
High	31.7	11.1	6.9	10.3	9.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(243)	(108)	(524)	(116)	(210)

$x^2 = 121.3$, $p < .001$, gamma = -.2214

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY SOCIAL CLASS

	Group				
Social Class	SDS	YD	CG	YR	YAF
Working Class	17.0	21.6	38.5	22.5	39.0
Lower-Middle Class	27.7	37.2	36.1	28.8	33.0
Upper-Middle Class	55.3	41.2	25.4	48.7	28.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(224)	(102)	(512)	(111)	(203)

$x^2 = 86.5$, $p < .001$, gamma = -.1999

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY ETHNICITY

	Group				
Ethnicity	SDS	YD	CG	YR	YAF
Low	62.9	68.9	59.2	38.2	31.2
High	37.1	31.1	40.8	61.8	68.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(194)	(90)	(422)	(102)	(192)

$x^2 = 68.7$, $p < .001$, gamma = .3495

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY PARENTS' RELIGION

Parents' Religion	Group				
	SDS	YD	CG	YR	YAF
Nonreligious	19.7	3.7	2.1	4.4	3.4
Jewish	42.7	61.5	40.0	21.0	13.0
Catholic	9.6	20.2	28.7	19.3	32.2
Protestant	28.0	14.6	29.2	55.3	51.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(239)	(109)	(520)	(114)	(208)

$x^2 = 235.5$, $p < .001$, gamma = .3882

TABLE 6

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT GROUPS BY FAMILY POLITICS

Family Politics	Group				
	SDS	YD	CG	YR	YAF
Radical Left	13.6	.9	.6	.9	0.0
Moderate Left	44.1	79.7	53.0	14.0	16.0
Independent	29.2	14.8	23.8	17.5	27.7
Moderate Right	12.7	4.6	22.4	66.7	50.0
Radical Right	.4	0.0	.2	.9	6.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(236)	(108)	(500)	(114)	(206)

$x^2 = 399.6$, $p < .001$, gamma = .5075


Class
X4
Religion
X6
Politics
X7
-.031
.054
.475
-.164
-.100
Rb
.986
Argue
X2 (R2=.028)
Decision
X3 (R2=.010)
.995
Rc
-.126
-.134
.131
.416
Ra
.844
Political
Identification
X1 (R2=.288**)

Zero-Order Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	6
1					
2	-.195**				
3	-.107**	.055			
4	-.113**	.036	.024		
6	.355**	-.165**	-.100*	-.031	
7	.482**	-.083*	-.093*	.054	.475**

Note: The variable Ethnicity (X_5) appeared to be not related significantly with our intervening and/or dependent variables in our path diagram and therefore was deleted from the model. The recursive equations for Figure 1 resemble the following:

$$X_3 = p_{36}\ X_6 + p_c\ R_c$$

$$X_2 = p_{26}\ X_6 + p_b\ R_b$$

$$X_1 = p_{12}\ X_2 + p_{14}X_4 + p_{16}X_6 + p_{17}X_7 + p_aR_a$$

**significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

FIGURE 1

PATH DIAGRAM SHOWING INFLUENCE OF FAMILY STATUS,
SOCIALIZATION ON STUDENT POLITICS FOR
TOTAL STUDENT GROUP SAMPLE (N = 893)


Rc
.992
Ra
.783
Argue X2
Class X4
Religion X6
Politics X7
Decision X3 (R2=.016)
Political Identification X1 (R2=.387**)
-.174
-.207
.105
-.085
-.125
.451
-.006
.004
.547

Zero-Order Correlation Matrix

	1	2	3	4	6
1					
2	-.258**				
3	-.171**	.094*			
4	-.206**	.010	-.015		
6	.384**	-.115*	-.125*	-.006	
7	.542**	-.137*	-.133*	.004	.547**

Note: The variable Ethnicity (X_5) appeared to be not related significantly with our intervening and/or dependent variables in our path diagram and therefore was deleted from the model. The recursive equations for Figure 2 resemble the following:

$$X_3 = p_{36}X_6 + p_cR_c$$

$$X_1 = p_{12}X_2 + p_{13}X_3 + p_{14}X_4 + p_{16}X_6 + p_{17}X_7 + p_aR_a$$

**significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

FIGURE 2

PATH DIAGRAM SHOWING INFLUENCE OF FAMILY STATUS, SOCIALIZATION ON STUDENT POLITICS FOR STUDENT ACTIVISTS (N = 528)

2


Rb
.977
Argue
X_2 (R^2=.046)
-.216
Religion
X_6
.209
.351
.277
Politics
X_7
Ra
.915
Political Identification
X_1 (R^2=.162**)

Zero-Order Correlation Matrix

	1	2	6
1			
2	-.084		
6	.307**	-.216*	
7	.350**	-.052	.351**

Note: The variables of Family Decision-Making (X_3), Social Class (X_4) and Ethnicity (X_5) appeared to be not related significantly with our intervening and/or dependent variables in our path diagram and therefore were deleted from the model. The recursive equations for Figure 3 resemble the following:

$$X_2 = p_{26}X_6 + P_bR_b$$

$$X_1 = p_{16}X_6 + p_{17}X_7 + P_aR_a$$

**significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

FIGURE 3

PATH DIAGRAM SHOWING INFLUENCE OF FAMILY STATUS, SOCIALIZATION ON STUDENT POLITICS FOR CONTROL GROUP (N = 396)

FOOTNOTES

*This paper is drawn from the author's doctoral dissertation and constitutes one segment of a larger and more comprehensive research project concerning student political activists at the Department of Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University. Acknowledgment is extended to Dr. David L. Westby and Dr. Rex H. Warland whose helpful suggestions were incorporated into this paper. Dr. Robert G. Bernreuter, Vice President for Student Affairs and Dr. Thomas F. Magner, Assistant Dean for Research of the College of Liberal Arts, The Pennsylvania State University, provided funds for the data collection and data processing phases of this project and for computation costs which preceded the analysis.

[1] Eisenstadt (1956), Erikson (1959, 1968), and Keniston (1963) have discussed university life as both a time and source of social and psychological strain for youth. Forced to play an alienated role in society, students no longer interact within the particularistic, ascriptive, diffuse spheres of the family and have yet to be included in the universalistic, personal achievement oriented and functionally specific occupational spheres of the world they will someday enter. As a result, total identification with societal institutional spheres is virtually nonexistent. However frustrating, this "intransigency of reality" has its positive effect: it allows youth a kind of "breathing space" between childhood and adulthood for the purpose of "playing at" or testing role alternatives required of future professional or "total" adult commitments. Erikson (1959) calls this socially sanctioned intermediary period an "institutionalized psychosocial moritorium" allowing adolescents and postadolescents time for psycho-sexual, social and political experimentation.

[2] This trend toward increasing societal differentiation is a well known phenomenon in political sociology. Societal massification has been discussed by such theorists as Durkheim (1960) in terms of increased division of labor; Weber (1964), bureaucratization-rationalization; Simmel (Wolff, 1950), "tyranny of objectivism"; Veblen (Qualey, 1968), the instrumental nature of technocracy; Mannheim (1940), the "main drift" from substantive to functional rationality in a liberal democracy; and by Mills (1956), the shift in power from publics to central elites. Bell (1962: 22-25) distinguishes five different themes of mass society: (1) mass as the sheer growth of undifferentiated numbers (in terms of a mass of standardizations diffused throughout the population); (2) mass as the judgment by the incompetent (Ortega y Gasset's elitist recriminations against the Third Estate); (3) mass as the mechanized society (society becomes the apparatus or cog in the technological process); (4) mass as a bureaucratized society in terms of the overorganization of life; and (5) the mass as an emerging undifferentiated collective sphere (aimless, uninformed and alienated).

[3] Ethnic or nationality groups are social collectivities which exhibit specific cultural or subcultural characteristics. In the United States, these subcultural identities provide the basis for individual identification and family-group solidarity. Immigrants coming to this country have experienced a historically determined scale of ethnic prestige and power depending on time of arrival to the New World (Hofstadter, 1963:75-95: Bridenbaugh, 1960:Chapter 1, 466-481). For example, during the period between the sixteenth century up to and including the turn of the twentieth century, English and Northern European descendants established themselves at the top of the hierarchy of ethnic status and prestige in colonial and

industrial America, while Asians, Africans, Southern and Eastern Europeans were ranked near the bottom (Baltzell, 1964:3-26; Elkin, 1968:87-91).

[4] That is, upper-middle-class family status is known to affect democratic decision-making and the development of autonomous reasoning and behavior in offspring. Conversely, lower-middle-class status is known to be related to more authoritarian and less autonomous reasoning and behavior.

[5] Davies defines political socialization in the following manner: "The family's central role in forming the individual's political personality derives from its role as the main source and locus for the satisfaction of all his basic, innate needs. The child therefore tends to identify with parents and to adopt their outlook toward the political system." (Davies, 1965:10) Also see the works and definitions of political socialization by Dawson and Prewitt (1969), Hyman (1959), Musgrove (1964), Almond and Verba (1965), Sigel (1965:1-9), Easton and Dennis (1965), Lane (1964), Douvan and Gold (1966:469-528).

[6] Greenstein (1965) also found that political socialization was conditioned by the social class backgrounds of youth. Children from upper-middle-class homes had superior I.Q.'s, verbal ability, psychic autonomy and exhibited greater willingness to express political ideas and feelings. These privileged youth were reared by parents who took their opinions seriously, who invited and encouraged them to participate in family activities and who made themselves (both fathers and mothers) readily accessible to their children's needs. The family structure of lower-middle-class children was more hierarchical with less direct communication between the generations. Upper-middle-class children were found to be better able to distinguish political parties, political personages and political issues at earlier ages and grade levels than their lower-class counterparts. And when asked,

"If you could change the world in any way you wanted, what change would you make?" older and upper-class youth answered in political terms, while younger and lower-class youth did also but to a lesser degree. When confronted with the question, "If you could vote, who would be best to ask for voting advice?" more upper-middle-class youth replied by saying they would make up their own minds, while lower-class children referred to parents and school leaders (Greenstein, 1965:67-70, 103-104).

[7] College campuses have produced changes in political preference in their student bodies. In his study of Bennington College coeds, Newcomb (1943) discovered when students found themselves in campus environs where both the faculty and their fellow students were politically aware and actively involved in politics, and when their parents offered little resistance to their political views, many students shifted political attitudes and party preference toward the majority, and in this case the more liberal position. Dawson and Prewitt (1969) likewise noted at great length the effect of primary, secondary group socialization on political behavior.

[8] Generally speaking, our definition of democratic family structure in terms of styles of parental-parental and parental-progeny interactions is synonomous with the term permissiveness as it generally has been discussed in the literature. That is, family structure can be either permissive (democratic) or restrictive (authoritarian) between the parents themselves, which has been discussed by Bronfenbrenner (1958, 1961, 1967), Kohn (1959, 1963), Keniston (1968), Flacks (1967), and others, or the parents can be permissive (democratic) or restrictive (authoritarian) with their progeny, as has been discussed by Kohn (1959, 1963), Keniston (1968), Flacks (1967), and others. Therefore the use of the term permissiveness has been somewhat ambiguous with respect to the level of interaction that

occurs between the parents themselves and/or between the parents and their progeny. Because of this lack of conceptual clarity, we prefer to use the concept democratic family structure in terms of parental level behavior in addition to parental-progeny level of behavior, rather than the general concept of permissiveness which fails to discriminate between the two levels of family interaction.

[9] Social class, ethnicity, parents' religious affiliation and family politics are operationalized as independent variables in our theoretical model which directly influence the socialization process, the intervening variable. Both independent and intervening variables affect student political activism, the dependent variable. In terms of causal logic and level of conceptual analysis, the theoretical model employed in this dissertation would be classified in the group-to-group (cell I) level of analysis based on the following typology.

		Independent and Intervening Variables (cause)	
		Group	Individual
Dependent Variable (effect)	Group	I	III
	Individual	II	IV

I In this cell, collective level phenomena affect other collective level phenomena. This is the group qua group level of causal analysis employed at the social structural level of sociological inquiry. In this paper the independent (class, ethnicity, religion and politics) and intervening (democratic decision-making and argumentation) variables affect the dependent variable (political activist group membership and identification). All variables are operationalized at the collective or group level of analysis.

II This is the group level cause affecting behavior at the individual level of analysis. The broad social psychological school of socialization applies here.

III In this cell, psychological level phenomena influence group or collective level behavior. This could be defined as the psychosocial level of causal analysis employed by the "great man" approach in social movements. Leadership, creativity and charismatic studies would be classified as falling in this cell.

IV This cell, which articulates individual level causes influencing individual level effects, is typical of psychological inquiry.

[10] It is interesting to note the divergent organizational styles of the two national conventions and the circumstances under which they were surveyed. No formal contacts or arrangements were made with national SDS prior to their Antioch Convention in early Spring, 1966. The author learned of the convention from two Penn State SDS members who had taken part in the study when the local SDS chapter was surveyed. The decision was made to attend the national convention in an attempt to extend the study to include its delegates. Three hundred questionnaires were assembled and the author, accompanied by one of the PSU delegates to the SDS convention, drove to Yellow Springs, Ohio. Contacts with national SDS leadership were made after we arrived, and Paul Booth, then National Secretary of SDS who indicated an interest in the study, made a public announcement inquiring if they would be interested in participating in such a survey. The study was explained to them, it was then publically debated and when brought to the vote, the overwhelming majority of convention

delegates (approximately 80% to 85%) voted to take part in the survey. As a result, some 125 SDS members were included in the sample.

The circumstances under which the YAF convention was surveyed are much different. National YAF was contacted and permission to survey their 1966 national convention, held at Franklin and Marshall College, was obtained from their Washington, D.C. headquarters. Formal arrangements were made by mail and a personal visit to Washington. When we emerged on the scene at Franklin and Marshall, 120 YAF students attending their convention took part in the survey which was not, to our knowledge, publically debated. It is presumed that the decision to take part in the survey was made by the National YAF leadership in Washington, D.C.

All activists who participated in the study were curious and asked numerous questions concerning the sponsorship and objectives of the study. Of course, left-wing youth accused the study of having a conservative bias, while about an equal number of right-wing students felt the study was liberally inspired. Both reactions serve as a nice balance or internal validity check for the research instrument.

[11] Two other universities, Columbia and Cornell, were approached for study but difficulty arose with respect to maintaining contact with group officials and a general unwillingness to participate which necessitated dropping these two schools from our study. In general, most youth responded favorably to the survey.

[12] To give some idea of how the families of our student groups compare with the general U.S. population on the demographic characteristics, education, occupation and income, the following percentages were gleaned from the 1966 U.S. Census figures and compared with our data. First, while the education level of families in the U.S. with some college

education is approximately 18.8%, the fathers of our student groups with similar educational level is: 70.7% SDS; 58.6% YD; 48.4% Control Group; 64.6% YR; and 49.0% YAF. Second, while 26.0% of the families in the U.S. have professional, managerial and proprietied occupational levels, 81.8% of SDS, 79.4% of YD, 58.2% of Control Group, 78.4% of YR and 61.1% of YAF come from families with similar occupational structures. Finally, when compared on income, 32.5% of the U.S. population come from families with incomes of $5,000 and less, while only 5.2% of SDS, 7.1% of YD, 6.4% of Control Group, 7.6% of YR and 11.5% of YAF come from family backgrounds with incomes under $5,000. When viewing these figures, there is little doubt that our total sample of collegiates, regardless of group affiliation, have education, occupation and income levels far in excess to that of the general U.S. population. U.S. Census data were quoted from Broom and Selznick (1968:162-164).

[13] This political continuum is based on the conceptual schemes of Mills (1948:13-30) and Rossiter (1962:11-14).

[14] When asked to indicate the general political philosophy closest to their own by identifying with one of these sixteen political personalities, the following group mean scores emerged: SDS = 3.11 (Lynd); YD = 6.10 (Kennedy); Control Group = 7.95 (Lippmann-Truman); YR = 10.13 (Eisenhower); YAF = 13.41 (Goldwater).

[15] For example, as discussed previously, numerous authors have traced the relationship between social class and student activism; ethnicity and student activism; religion, politics and/or family socialization and student activism. At the same time, there is also a wealth of research indicating the association between social class and family socialization or democratic family behavior. What has not been attempted thus far is an

analysis explaining the causes of student political activism in terms of an asymmetric multivariate explanatory framework--although this latter approach has been suggested and implied but not actually tested in the works of Lipset (1968a, 1968b), Keniston (1968), and Flacks (1967).

[16] The gamma, which ranges from -1 to +1, tells us if two individuals are selected at random, what probability do they have of exhibiting the same or different rankings on the two ordinally scaled variables under scrutiny (ties are excluded as irrelevant). For example, a gamma of -.50 says for a pair of randomly drawn individuals we have a .50 probability that they will be ranked differently, rather than ranked the same on the variables under investigation (Hays, 1963:655-656; Zelditch, 1959:180-187; Weiss, 1968:201-205).

[17] The technique of path analysis controls for possible interrelationships and permits all the variables to operate simultaneously. However, path analysis, which utilizes beta coefficients, requires the parametric assumptions be met; that is, of intervally scaled data which are presumed normally distributed and have homogeneity of variance. As remembered, our data are at best ordinally scaled. However, much research has evidenced that the relaxation of the parametric assumptions does not appreciably or adversely affect the results of the parametric test. In fact, Blalock (1964:34-35; 1968:196-197), Labovitz (1967:151-160) and Land (1969:3-37), in their discussion of causal model testing, all comment on the general ordinal level of measurement of most sociological data and suggest that if one can conceive of his variables as continuous then proceed with correlation-regression techniques if they prove to be theoretically relevant. Because the path analysis technique fits our theoretical framework, and since Sewell and Shah (1968:559-572) and Spaeth (1968:548-558)

have used the path analysis technique successfully with ordinal data, we will employ path analysis as a cummulative causal treatment of our theoretical assumptions.

[18] Nonadditive, nonlinear and time lapse models are possible with the aid of mathematical transformations.

[19] In some instances a residual may be intercorrelated with variables preceding but not immediate determinants of the dependent variable to which it pertains. The formula for the computation of residuals is $\sqrt{1 - R^2}$, where R^2 is the multiple correlation coefficient squared (Land, 1969:18).

[20] Unlike partial correlation and regression coefficients, there is no decimal point followed by secondary subscripts to identify the other variables which also affect the dependent variable. These unidentified variables are evident in the diagram and equations. Since "the correlation between any pair of variables can be written in terms of the paths leading from common antecedent variables," then the basic theorem can be stated as follows: $r_{ij} = \sum p_{iq} r_{jq}$, when i and j = two variables in the model, q represents all variables from which paths lead directly to X_i. The path is discerned by reading, "...back from variable i, then forward to variable j, forming the product of all paths along the traverse; then sum these products for all possible traverses." Residuals are indicated by a straight line from a capital "R" outside the model to the appropriate dependent variable with the unexplained variation indicated beside the line. Unanalyzed correlations between variables not dependent on others in the model are indicated by a curving two-headed arrow with its appropriate zero-order correlation coefficient (Duncan, 1966:5-6).

[21] With samples over 1,000, if the beta coefficient is at least twice the size of the standard error of the beta, then it is considered statistically significant (Duncan, 1966:6).

[22] Strength connotes relative size of each gamma in relation to the other gammas for our data. For example, we will consider gammas of .10 and below as low, between .11 to .29 as medium, and .30 or above as high since in this latter instance, gammas of .30 or higher are rare for our data.

[23] Further analysis of this information along with causal analysis testing procedures was performed on the data which controlled for all possible variable combinations (see Braungart, 1969).

[24] It should be noted here that in our path analysis tests, we are no longer employing the nominally-ordinally scaled variable of group identification, as was used in our descriptive, bivariate analysis. We will utilize political identification as the dependent variable, which is ordinally-intervally scaled from revolutionary left to revolutionary right.

[25] Although ethnicity was not related to decision-making ($r = -.029$), argument score ($r = -.054$), or social class ($r = .070$), it was highly interrelated with the independent variables of religion ($r = .576$, significant at .01) and family politics ($r = .395$, significant at .01).

[26] The direct and indirect effects are computed by the formula $r_{ij} = p_{ij}$ (direct effect) + $\sum p_{iq} r_{jq}$ (indirect effects), when i and j are two variables in the model and q represents all variables from which paths lead directly to X_i. The specific calculations for ethnicity in our model are as follows:

$$r_{15} = p_{15} + p_{12}\ r_{52} + p_{13}\ r_{53} + p_{14}\ r_{54} + p_{16}\ r_{56} + p_{17}\ r_{57}$$

$$r_{15} = .033 + (-.119)(-.054) + (-.036)(-.029) + (-.128)(.077) + (.118)(.576) + (.421)(.395$$

$$r_{15} = .033 + .006 + .001 + -.010 + .068 + .166$$

$$r_{15} = .033 \text{ (direct effect) } + .231 \text{ (indirect effects)}$$

[27] When computing the direct and indirect effects of argue (X_2), class (X_4), religion (X_6) and politics (X_7) with political identification (X_1), the following relationships emerged. The total direct effect of argue on political identification equaled -.134, while the total indirect effect on argue with political identification was -.061. Politics (-.034) and religion (-.022) had the largest indirect effect with argument-political identification, $r_{12} = -.134 + -.061$. The direct effect of class on political identification was -.126. The total indirect effect on class-political identification (.013) was influenced mainly by politics (.022), $r_{14} = -.126 + .013$. The direct effect of religion on political identification was .131, while the total indirect effect on religion-political identification (.224) was greatly influenced by politics (.198), $r_{16} = .131 + .224$. The direct effect of politics on political identification was .416 and the total indirect effect on politics-political identification (.066) was influenced by religion (.062), $r_{17} = .416 + .066$. When explaining the path equation to determine the indirect effects, we observe the strong underlying effects politics and religion exert on the endogenous variables in our model.

[28] When exploring the direct and indirect effects of the endogenous variables in Figures 2 and 3, we note the following relationships. For the Control Group, the direct effect of religion on political identification is .209, while the indirect effect of politics on religion-political identification is .097, $r_{16} = .209 + .097$. Similarly, the direct

effect of politics on political identification is .277, while the indirect effect of religion on politics-political identification is .073, r_{17} = .277 + .073. For the activists, the direct and indirect effects are as follows. The direct effect of argue on political identification is -.174, while the indirect effects of decision, class, religion and politics on argue-political identification is -.084, which is due primarily to the indirect effect of politics on argue-political identification (-.062), r_{12} = -.174 + -.084. The direct effect of decision-making on political identification is -.085, and the indirect effect is -.086, again due mainly to the influence of politics on the decision-political identification relationship (-.060), r_{13} = -.085 + -.086. The direct effect of class on political identification is -.207, while the total indirect effects on class-political identification are almost negligible (.001), r_{14} = -.207 + .001. The direct effect of religion on political identification is .105, and the indirect effects of the other variables in the model on this relationship is substantial (.279), primarily due to the influence of politics (.247) and argument score (.020), r_{16} = .105 + .279. And finally, the direct effect of family politics on political identification is .451, while the indirect effects of the other variables in the model on this relationship are .091, with religion (.057) and argument score (.024) contributing the majority of the indirect effects, r_{17} = .451 + .091. Therefore, we can note, as with the total sample, most of the indirect effects are due to the influence of family politics on the endogenous variables in the model for both the Control and activist group path diagrams.

[29] While religion alone is able to explain variance in our intervening socialization variables, the amount of variance explained is minuscule

when compared with the total explained variance for the dependent variable in all three path diagrams. And further, religion and politics are highly interrelated in all three diagrams (r_{67} = .475 for total sample; r_{67} = .547 for activist sample; and r_{67} = .351 for Control Group sample), which suggests the strength of the independent variable, religion, on indices of socialization is partially due to the influence of politics on religion.

[30]Lipset (1968c) explicates religion as a "value-generating institution" influencing both child rearing practices and political direction, where those from the majority religion in any country tend to be more conservative and constraining than those from the minority religious groups. He pointed out that in many countries throughout the world political cleavage is a direct result of different historical experiences, religious values and dissenting sects which bears directly on the style of politics exhibited by the religious communities. This appeared to be true in our study. In his discussion of religion and party, Lipset suggested five kinds of religious variation that bear directly on political differentiation: (1) different social characteristics (church composition, geographical concentration, interests, et cetera); (2) different historical experiences; (3) different religious values; (4) different forms of religious dissent; and (5) religious political parties (Lipset, 1968c: 169-176). Flacks' (1967:61) research suggests the importance of strong commitment to religious value patterns--emotional sensitivity, humanitarianism, moralism--in the background of leftist activist families. Such homes appear to be more democratic, permissive than nonactivist homes. Conversely, Schiff (1964:74-95) maintains that strong moral commitment

is also a predominant characteristic of conservative youth. Further research should be conducted in the area of religious socialization and student politics.

[31] See for example the discussions by Easton and Dennis (1965:40-58), Sigel (1965:1-9), Pinner (1965:58-70), Prewitt (1965:96-111), Hyman (1959), Greenstein (1965), Davies (1965:10-19), Dawson and Prewitt (1969:105-126) and Langton (1969).

[32] In our preliminary path analysis tests, demographic variables (age, GPA, et cetera) were included along with the family status and socialization factors in an attempt to explain more variance in the dependent variable. These additional structural independent factors did not appreciably add to the amount of variance explained and they were therefore excluded from our path analysis models.

[33] Smith (1968:15-27) is concerned with a broad conceptual framework including both temporally distal and proximal determinants of personality and politics. This is accomplished through the study of political opinions in terms of their cognitive (object appraisal) motivational (mediating self-other) and affective (externalization of ego) components.

[34] Geschwender (1968:127-135) developed a general argument of social movements based on one fundamental theme--cognitive dissonance. He maintains that the five leading hypotheses explaining social movements and revolutions, notably: (1) the rise and drop hypothesis, (2) the rising expectation hypothesis, (3) the relative deprivation hypothesis, (4) the downward mobile hypothesis and (5) the status inconsistency hypothesis, all articulate or exhibit cognitive dissonance in some way. Dissonance reduction activities in turn take the form of social protests, radical or revolutionary behavior.

[35] However, we cannot dismiss categorically the generational animus theory since our data did suggest that left-wing student activists tended to be somewhat more alienated from their parents than the other student groups in our sample. However, this alienation did not exhibit the oedipal or political manifestations mentioned by Feuer (1969), nonetheless SDS members did indicate greater antipathy or inability to communicate with their parents than the other groups (Braungart, 1969).

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